SUCCESSFUL INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COMMUNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENT IN THE COMMUNE OF ADJAMÉ, ABIDJAN, CÔTE D'IVOIRE [1]

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Introduction

In Côte d'Ivoire, the transfer of administrative powers to elected municipal councils, in 1985, transformed urban management by introducing new dimensions of representation and accountability in local governance. In the depth of the recession, the newly elected mayors faced an increasingly critical situation as the imbalances between responsibilities and resources became untenable.

Mayor, Dembélé Lassina, first elected in 1985[2], launched one of the most creative community based initiatives in West Africa. In a context of dramatic declines in income, civil unrest and changing political structures, crisis management of cities in sub-Saharan Africa occurred within an institutional framework suffering from imbalances and ambiguities. The transfer of administrative powers to the elected mayors and municipal councils in Abidjan's different districts, referred to as "communes," injected new vitality into urban management. Communes set their own priorities for capital and operating expenditures, raising revenues, and implementing small-scale works. Given the hardships caused by structural adjustment, the mayor opted to experiment with innovative approaches to mobilize citizens and generate resources locally.

The experience of Adjamé, one of 12 administrative jurisdictions referred to as "communes" in the city of Abidjan, is particularly interesting because it demonstrates how a forward looking mayor with a clear vision and a sense of mission can create, nurture and institutionalize an innovative approach to community based development relying on empowerment and local resources.

Background

Adjamé is one of Abidjan's oldest urban districts and is also presently the city's commercial core. It has the largest markets in the city accounting for 25% of all mercantile activities. Adjamé is also Abidjan's principal transportation node where regional highways intersect and the interurban and suburban bus terminals are located. A wide range of public facilities are strung alongside its Boulevard and major streets. The current population of Adjamé is estimated at approximately 220,000, about half of who have immigrated from neighboring countries in search of employment opportunities. Non-Ivorians dominate the trade sector. A powerful group of women control activities in the major markets. Over one million people transit daily through Adjamé (passengers, shoppers, bus and taxi operators, retail vendors, peddlers, etc.) contributing to the economy but adding to problems of security and solid waste management.

During the economic boom of the 1970's, rents in Adjamé rose by a factor of six. Despite the recession in the 1990's, real estate values continued to rise to roughly three times the Abidjan average. The deepening recession diverted business from upscale shops in the CBD to the popular markets, contributing to the spillover of formal and informal activities into Adjamé. Along major roads three to four story buildings started appearing as "modern" commercial development as gentrification occurred. Commercial taxes, the mainstay of municipal finance, which accounted for over 50% of revenue, increased sharply.

[2]The municipal Council is the governing body of the commune. It consists of 46 members which are elected as a slate (representing a political party). The Council chooses the mayor, although their choice is known prior to the election. The campaign, therefore, is as much an election for mayor as an election for the Municipal Council.

The impact of infrastructure improvements on living conditions was mitigated over the years by densification. Absentee landlords refrained from making any improvements to their premises, while owner occupants confined improvements to their own premises. The vast majority of residents continued to purchase water from vendors and use overloaded on-site wastewater disposal systems in areas where densities reach 800-1000 persons per hectare. Services provided to lower income communities by the privately operated water supply, electricity and solid waste collection services were highly inadequate. The bulk of the refuse was not collected and ended up on the roadbed or in drainage ditches. It was hardly surprising that sanitation ranked highest among pressing problems in the poorer neighborhoods.

Vision and Strategy of Community Based Development

Mayor Dembele Lassina came to office with a vision of a self-reliant community grounded in individual initiative, social cohesion and democratic governance. The policies he advocated reflected his conviction that:

- The human and material resources to improve the quality of life of Adjamé's inhabitants exist within the community itself. Needs must be recognized, problems understood and the efforts demanded in line with the affordability of Adjamé's population and sensitive to the constraints under which they live.

- The residents are fully capable of organizing and mobilizing the resources required to meet their most pressing needs.

- Improved awareness of potentialities and collaborative efforts among local actors can overcome entrenched dependency on public authorities and perennial dissension among the diverse social groups within the municipality.

The Mayor's strategies were based on three underlying fundamental principles:

1. A strong belief that all inhabitants of the municipality must act together.

79717804. A commitment to develop and institutionalize the organizational structures enabling citizens to control their own development process. In meetings and interviews, he reasserted that: "We must establish our own organizational structures in our commune." ("Il faut créer des structures propres à notre commune.")

79717892. An unwavering faith in the capacity of young people to act responsibly and to provide economic, social and organizational leadership.

The shortage of public resources prompted the mayor to organize an action group to implement programs for the improvement of living conditions in Adjamé's neighborhoods and to mobilize residents to actively participate in these efforts that focused primarily on urgent health and sanitation issues. The Comité d'Actions Sanitaires et Sociales, a 25 member group represented the political and social leadership and emphasized the interests and concerns of women and youths. Ten members were from the Association des Femmes Ivoiriennes (AFI) and another 10 from the Union des Jeunes d'Adjamé (UJA). The committee's most successful initiative was the street sweeping project for the main

commercial artery and the immediate vicinity of the central market, a major generator of garbage and trash. The project was initiated in October 1988. The team consisted of 24 women to sweep the streets and collect the refuse and 16 men to convey the collected garbage to the dumpsters and supervise the work. Team members were remunerated through contributions collected from merchants in the market area. About 2000 businesses paid this remittance. Attempts to replicate this project in the residential quarters have been less successful. The contributions collected from households simply failed to provide for adequate remuneration of team members.

The committee's activities demonstrated the benefits of citizen participation and also brought to light the need for outreach at the neighborhood level. The deepening recession entailed that residents had to assume primary responsibility for the improvement and management of their neighborhood. To underscore this new strategy and redefine its role as the support group for a new layer of grass roots organizations, the committee changed its name from "Comité" to "Groupement"(GASS).

Adapting the French model he observed in Marseilles to local conditions in Adjamé, the Mayor established in 1988 neighborhood committees, referred to as "Comité de développement de quartier" (CDQ), to engage the energies of residents for the promotion of social, economic and cultural development. Focusing on unemployment and poverty as the root causes of social ills and environmental degradation, their strategy was to promote economic activities and provide jobs for the unemployed. In the process they tried to alleviate the most pressing environmental and social problems in the neighborhood.

CDQs took an active role in organizing teams to undertake badly needed sanitation tasks. For these services they charged a fee which generated revenue to compensate the work. They provided crews to pump out sewage tanks in housing compounds, clean open drain ditches and sweep streets.

By 1990, eight CDQs were operational and others were in the process of being organized. In 1995, Adjamé's 19 neighborhoods all had CDQs. Some were very dynamic and innovative. This was the case of the Williamsville II CDQ serving one of the poorest districts in the city where infrastructure was lacking, "bidonvilles" and informal settlements abound, and sanitation was a major challenge. The most lethargic was in an area of multifamily housing for civil servants where housing associations focusing on individual buildings had undermined the community-oriented CDQ.

CDQ Activities

The CDQs were involved in many different activities, to varying degrees of success. These included:

Street cleaning and garbage collection;
Security services;
Commercial enterprises, including running public fountains, stores, sports facilities, and public latrines;
Small infrastructure improvements, such as road improvement and maintenance of drains and street lighting; and

Social services, like literacy campaigns, helping poor or abandoned children and the handicapped.

Institutional Structure of the CDQs and their Interface with the Municipality

The internal structure of the CDQs included three basic components: the president; the executive council, whose members must be residents of the area and did not receive any compensation; and the operational units that undertook activities and whose staff was remunerated. Local elders, civic leaders and merchants were often included as additional members of the council. In some instances they constituted a separate council of "wisemen." An earlier experiment in solid waste management, launched in 1986, relied on volunteers. The ineffectiveness of these PVOs convinced the mayor that the sustainability of community based initiatives hinged on the ability to generate funds in order to adequately remunerate workers. Adjamé's population was too poor to afford the opportunity cost of volunteering for any length of time.

CDQ presidents were elected. The election was organized by the municipality which was responsible for compiling the voter registration rolls and issuing identity cards. In order to become CDQ members eligible to vote, neighborhood residents had to pay a fee equivalent to 40 cents and they received a membership card issued by the CDQ. To cast their vote they presented both their CDQ membership card and their identity card. In 1995, there were around 7,000 to 8,000 active members of the CDQs in Adjamé, the majority of whom were dynamic young people. The ability of the CDQs to attract them and channel their energies to foster local development was important given that 60% of Adjamé's population was between the ages of 18 and 35. In addition, it gave them hope for the future and a sense of purpose in that they were working to improve their economic prospects and living standards.

Over the years, the CDQ structure and its interface with the municipality have evolved, first in response to national political liberalization, and then as a result of the Mayor's forceful strategy of empowerment. CDQ leadership became more representative, governance more democratic, and management more accountable.

By 1995, the original structure of the CDQ vested decision making in the general assembly of CDQ members, policy formulation in the council of overseers appointed by the Mayor and integrated within the municipality's organizational structure and implementation in the CDQ executive board comprised of elected and ex-officio members. The ex-officio members were local party leaders and party representatives at local branches of national organizations active in the community, such as the Ivorian Women Organization, the Youth Organization, etc..

Following the institution of the multi-party system in 1990, the ruling party's monopoly on CDQ representation was abolished. Civic organizations were free to nominate representatives irrespective of political affiliation. It was a bold decision that underscored the civic mission of the CDQs but carried a political cost. Despite the fact that the Mayor himself remained a registered member of the party, ill-advised decisions by overzealous bureaucrats disrupted Central support of Adjamé's initiatives.

The CDQ executive board included 10 to 15 members and worked through subcommittees responsible for specific activities. This structure proved effective for the mobilization of residents but inefficient for project implementation. As the community developed a better understanding of the concept of CDQs, their participatory structures and their development

mission, the logical next step was to bolster their autonomy and accountability. The unwieldy board was replaced by a six member executive office appointed and chaired by the CDQ president. Furthermore, each newly elected president presented a proposed action program to the general assembly for approval. This meant that local leaders had to campaign for the CDQ presidency on the strength of an agenda and a slate of executive officers, as well as on their own status within the community. Despite this democratization, there was some lingering confusion regarding the structure of the CDQs. The fact that the president and the executive council members did not receive a salary was still not well known among the general population and they were sometimes perceived as employees of the municipality.

CDQ presidents had to submit an annual report on activities and achievements which the assembly could accept or reject. If more than two-thirds of the members were dissatisfied with the president's performance, they could initiate impeachment procedures, institute an interim executive and call for new elections. In the few cases where CDQ presidents had been ousted, the causes of the membership revolt were embezzlement, inertia or lack of concern for the marginal areas in the neighborhood. In each case, the disgruntled constituency had sought the advice of the CDQ secretary general in the municipality regarding what to do and how to proceed. His recommendation was first to ask the president to resign, then to refrain from paying fees and charges to the CDQ administration. If the president still refused to resign, then to proceed with impeachment and new elections.

Other less serious instances of friction between CDQ executives and residents arose from a lack of understanding of regulatory constraints. Municipalities were not authorized to service illegal settlements which had not been regularized. They could request regularization but the process of delineating properties and public rights of way and issuing land titles was controlled by central agencies. Consequently, CDQs were unable to directly address infrastructure problems in squatter settlements. However, mobilized residents often organized to undertake pressing drainage works on their own.

The CDQ structure empowered Adjamé's residents and gave them greater control over decisions that affected their lives. Dynamic CDQ leaders learned to further their community's interests and to use the CDQ structure to organize self-defense committees in order to deflect political pressure and fight exactions and corruption usually associated with the issuance of permits for street vending.

Restructuring the Interface between the Commune and the CDQs

During his second term in office, the Mayor restructured the governance of the CDQs to empower them and give them greater autonomy. He obtained preliminary approval from the Ministry of the Interior in 1993 to grant CDQs the legal status of "associations reconnues d'utilité publique." This would allow them to access grants and other categories of funds directly from central agencies, intermediary NGO's or other sources. Parallel to this evolution, the commune changed the way it oversaw their functioning. The old framework consisted of two committees: the CDQ commission (Commission des CDQ) affiliated with the City Council, and the Council of CDQ Presidents (Conseil des Presidents de CDQ) under the Mayor's chairmanship. The framework established three committees:

1. *Monitoring Committee* (Comité de Suivi) working most directly with CDQs and overseeing their management. It would be composed of the mayor, two members of the Municipal Council, two CDQ Presidents and a General Secretary.
2. *Communal Executive Council of the CDQs* (Bureau Executif Communal des CDQ) would be the standing committee of CDQ Presidents. It coordinated the activities of the CDQs and proposed projects to the Municipal Council through the Projects Bureau.
3. *The Projects Bureau* (Guichet Unique des Projets) would collect, analyze and prepare the proposals submitted by the CDQs for presentation to the Municipal Council, the central government and funding agencies. It was envisioned, however, that individual CDQs could also prepare projects and seek funding independently. The bureau would provide them with technical assistance to package their proposals. The Commune hoped that the central government would provide the Bureau with experts and, in general, encourage CDQs to draw on existing expertise in the Municipal Council.

Entrepreneurial leaders were instrumental to the performance of CDQs. Experienced businessmen had invariably been the most successful presidents, marshaling contacts and resources and launching new initiatives.

CDQ Finances

A closer look at financing highlights the strength of a strategy that ensured sustainability by providing seed capital for new initiatives, but required activities to be operated on a self-supporting basis.

When they were first set up, the nineteen CDQs received seed capital from the Commune in the form of cash contributions and physical plant. A total of three million CFA[3]* ($12,000) was initially allocated to the 19 CDQs to open a bank account and start up their operations. The amount of the grant depended primarily on the population of the area and its relative wealth with larger shares allocated to the more disadvantaged neighborhoods.

The Commune also transferred to the CDQs privatized public facilities such as public latrines and fountains which could be operated at a profit and premises in the markets built by the Commune where small businesses could start up. These microenterprises would retain the income generated from their operations and become self-financing. The sponsoring CDQ received a share of net profits as working capital to fund new activities. CDQs had repeatedly requested authorization to manage the enterprises themselves. The mayor encouraged them to refrain from doing so, pointing to the higher efficiency of independent private entrepreneurs. The one latrine under CDQ management was inoperative due to litigation and few fountains returned significant revenue due to the high fees and large deposit demanded by the SODECI, the water company. Having to rely on the resources they generated to finance their activities, CDQs sought to diversify their revenues as well as their activities, given the limited amounts that could be derived from any one source. Revenues fell into two basic categories:

1. User fees for services delivered by the CDQ, such as security, sanitation and garbage collection.

[3]* The CFA is pegged to the French franc and was devalued in 1993 and 1994 for a cumulative devaluation of 100%. The new exchange rate has been set at 1FF = 100 CFAF.

2. Income from commercial leases and operations.

In a predominantly residential area, such as Indénie, user fees accounted for over 85% of CDQ revenues. In commercial or mixed-use zones, such as Mairie II, revenues were higher by a factor of two to three. User fees account for 65%, leases for 10-15% and permit fees for 10%. Wealthy CDQ presidents and community leaders usually donated furnishings and equipment for CDQ headquarters, as well as cash contributions to cover operating deficits. Indénie's CDQ had received from its president a cash donation amounting to 10% of its revenues in addition to the rent free use of the premises it occupies, including utilities, office furniture and equipment, and a telephone line. Except for the start up seed capital, CDQs did not receive transfers from the commune of Adjamé. At the time, none of the 19 CDQs are subsidized through the municipal budget.

Overall in 1994, CDQs collected 60 million CFA ($120,000) in service fees and received 1.5 million CFA ($3,000) in income from leases. The security service was quite popular and fees for garbage collection had been relatively easy to collect, but street sweeping had to be cross-subsidized. In general, CDQ presidents complained that fees had become harder to collect affecting the sustainability of some services. Reluctance to pay was alternatively attributed to the economic crisis, inadequate service or perception of mismanagement.

Street Cleaning and Garbage Collection
Depending on the neighborhood, the CDQ would either sweep the streets, collect garbage or, both. Garbage was collected from each household and brought to the collection station where the waste management company picked it up. In relatively well-off residential areas they did neither as the privately operated city services did the job. In the market areas, the Mairie II CDQ swept the streets after the market closed at sunset. In the informal settlements of Williamsville II, the CDQ was unable to provide either service. The CDQs charged monthly fees of 10-25 CFA for street vendors, 400-500 CFA for small shops, and 1,000 CFA for larger stores. Households were charged according to the size of the dwelling they occupied: 250 CFA for 1-2 rooms, and 500 CFA for three or more rooms. Street sweepers or garbage collectors were paid 10,000 CFA per month.

At first, CDQs had no problem collecting fees. In 1995 they still had no problem with fees for garbage collection but did for street sweeping. In the market area, for example, shop owners complained that they were overtaxed and did not have sufficient revenues to meet the various exactions during a severe economic recession when people were curtailing purchases of goods and services. In the Mairie II CDQ area there were 1,000 stores of which 200 were vacant, which was an unprecedented situation. Of the 800 stores, only 250 paid street sweeping fees regularly. Other conditions leading to collection problems were the following:

- In the rainy season, unpaved roads were not cleaned and residents stopped paying the street sweeping fees.
- Residents refused to pay fees when CDQ presidents or members of the executive office were accumulating assets out of line with their acknowledged income.

The street sweepers were both young men and women. They were provided with uniforms, brooms and garbage carts. Williamsville II financed its initial purchase of the equipment in a creative manner. The CDQ asked the street sweepers and the security guards to forego one

and a half months of their salaries, and used the fees it collected to pay for the equipment, along with some seed capital from the Commune.

Security
With the onset of the economic crisis, security emerged as a major issue and the CDQs felt compelled to address. Fees were collected from households and businesses and young men from the neighborhood were hired to patrol the streets and control access to the market area. The guards were given uniforms, a whistle, and a flashlight. They were paid 10,000 CFA per month. The fees that the CDQs charged were 200-500 CFA per month for businesses and 250-500 CFA for households.

The security service was quite popular and the funds collected initially were used to cross-subsidize the street sweeping activity. CDQ presidents complained that fees had become harder to collect, affecting the sustainability of the street sweeping activity. The new reluctance to pay was alternatively attributed to perception of safer streets, inadequate services or mismanagement.

Commercial Activities
The range of activities undertaken by CDQs depended on assets transferred to them as well as their locational advantages.

1. Public Latrines and Fountains

The contracts for many public latrines were due to expire at the end of 1994. The CDQs were making a bid to take over their operation. They sought to do the same for public fountains. However, leases were still awarded by the Commune and there was no guarantee that CDQs would be authorized to do so by the City Council. The devaluation of the CFA affected the feasibility of infrastructure and sanitation projects. The Mairie II CDQ, which had the major market located within its geographic boundaries, wanted to build a large modern public latrine.

2. Commercial Facilities

Because of the revenues they provided, commercial facilities were the CDQs' most prized assets. The commune gave Mairie II a store, which it leased out for 50,000 CFA per month. In addition, it received a one-time fee of 1.5 million CFA and negotiated to lease space to open a café. The CDQ also acquired a small flour mill which it wished to lease. Other CDQs lack Mairie II's strategic location, opportunity and infrastructure. The less endowed CDQs wanted to buy chairs and awnings to rent out for special functions, despite the fact that they would be competing with private businesses offering similar services. Two CDQs had been awarded contracts to manage sports stadiums located in their territory, which they leased out for events and used as overnight parking lots. They were responsible for the management and maintenance of the facilities but received no funds from the Commune. One of the two stadiums is Adjamé's sports complex.

3. Infrastructure Construction and Maintenance

There was a keen awareness of urban infrastructure as a valuable capital asset for the residents, the CDQs and Adjamé. The general consensus is that infrastructure must be maintained and valorized despite the curtailment of central transfers. CDQ teams regularly cleaned clogged open drain channels and repaired potholes after heavy rainfalls that eroded

the compacted earth on the unpaved roadbeds. The CDQs usually purchased fill material and looked to the Municipality to pay for the rental of machinery, particularly bulldozers and backhoes. Underground sewers required specialized equipment that they did not have. The Municipality had to request service from the private water company, SODECI, which had been contracted to manage the water borne sewerage system. CDQs complained that the SODECI did not respond to service calls. Open-drain channels could be cleaned by the residents, but underground sewers required specialized equipment that CDQs did not have.

CDQ involvement went well beyond the activities they could carry out on their own. They contributed financially from their own resources and raised funds from area residents to support infrastructure projects undertaken by the Municipality that affected their neighborhoods. The CDQ mobilized funds that could amount to about 30% of project cost. The municipality made it a practice to hire the workforce locally. Given Adjamé's five-year capital investment program (1990-95) of 309 million CFA ($620,000), the CDQ's contribution was rather impressive. By promoting the hiring of local laborers, 5.5 million CFA ($12,000) had been channeled to local contractors providing jobs for 200 workers.

The Municipality, in another new development in working with the CDQs, had been negotiating with the privately operated utilities to upgrade services in the poorer neighborhoods. In 1994, the French water company, SODECI, cut the cost of a basic house connection by 60% from over 10,000 CFA($20) to 4,000 CFA($8). CDQs requested the SODECI to extend one connection at the reduced rate to each housing compound and authorize one reseller within the compound. In exchange they agreed to help control unauthorized vending. As a result, access to safe potable water was significantly expanded.

The Canadian solid waste management company, ASH, had curtailed curbside collection and reduced the number of designated collection stations in Adjamé. Inconvenient location of dumpsters and irregular collection resulted in illegal dumping and the accumulation of trash and garbage generated by the markets and the bus terminal. The Municipality and the CDQs negotiated with the Company to take on the responsibility for curbside collection and deposit of wastes in a limited number of stations along major paved roads. They sought an abatement of Adjamé's assessment for solid waste management. The savings would be earmarked to purchase equipment to support a joint CDQ-municipality collection effort that would help alleviate serious health hazards.

The Habitat-Extension CDQ convinced the residents on the street where the new health center was located to contribute money to hire a plumber in order to install a sewer line to channel water to the street. In the unserviced informal settlement of Williamsville II, the residents themselves, not the CDQ, built drainage ditches. Some CDQs, such as Habitat-Extension, put in speed bumps which were very popular given the overwhelming predominance of pedestrians and the large number of children playing or walking in the streets.

Other Activities

The success of the CDQ concept encouraged Adjamé's mayor to launch two very ambitious initiatives each with its own CDQ style administrative structure. The first was a Health CDQ (CDQ Santé), which would have an independent administrative structure. The objective of the Health initiative was to create a health center in each of the 19 neighborhoods, managed

by an independent CDQ structure, whose executive council would consist of a president elected for two years by a general public assembly, a doctor, a manager, a representative of the local CDQ, and a representative of the municipality.

The first CDQ health center was completed and fully operational by April 1995. The Municipality paid for the renovation of an existing building, medical equipment, rent and supplies for the first six months of operation at a cost of about 10.5 million CFA ($21,000). Following this start up period, the health center was expected to be financially self-supporting. The fees charged for the services of the doctor and paramedical staff had been set initially at approximately one tenth of the rate currently charged by the government hospital under the fee structure enacted as part of the curtailment of social subsidies. At this time,very few private clinics in Adjamé had doctors. Most were run by paramedical staff and lacked basic equipment. Even there, the fees were unaffordable to lower income residents. After the first six months of operation, the CDQ board would review the fee structure, as well as the operating expenses to ensure financial viability.

Pharmaceutical supplies constituted a major bottleneck due to the delays in accessing lower priced supplies provided by the Ministry of Public Health. After waiting for over six months, the Mayor decided in March 1995 to purchase supplies on the open market at much higher prices in order to enable the Center to operate properly and avoid damaging the CDQ's credibility. He actively sought the assistance of international NGOs to help secure medical supplies at a lower cost. In May, the center launched, jointly with the Health Institute, a vaccination campaign reaching 800 children. In just over three months (April-June), the center's receipts covered operating expenses, including salaries of 350,000 CFA ($700)/month and 200,000 CFA($400)/month of medical supplies. Municipal seed funding allowed management to accumulate a surplus of 724,000 CFA ($1,500) credited towards the constitution of a working capital in anticipation of having to assume full responsibility for the center in September.

The success of this pilot effort encouraged the mayor to launch a second center in another district. The municipality did not have the capacity to finance more than one center at a time. Nevertheless, the mayor was already developing a long-term strategy that would draw on the resources of all 19 centers to set up a full service health clinic in Adjamé.

The second new initiative combined micro incubators and training programs to encourage young Ivorians to start commercial businesses, a sector they have overlooked, preferring to seek clerical jobs during the economic boom. In the initial phase, 40 young men and women were selected for apprenticeship with local businesses and were being sent to a three-month training session at the Higher Institute for Commercial Studies. A shop would be established in every neighborhood market and would be operated by the trainees for a period of one year. Municipal backing allowed the CDQ to find companies willing to supply merchandise to the store on credit. The first was opened in late June at a cost of about 2 million CFA ($4,000) to the municipality. It was operated by two young graduates from the Institute's Program. The young men received a fixed compensation of 20,000 CFA ($40) from sales revenue for the one-year period. After a three-month start up grace period they would have to cover their own operating costs including rent. The balance of the revenue would be deposited in a savings account and used first to pay back the start up funds granted by the municipality and

then to accumulate seed capital for the young entrepreneurs to start their own businesses. Another team of graduates would then take over the operation of the CDQ store.

Concluding Remarks

In the face of seemingly overwhelming obstacles, Adjamé managed to initiate and institutionalize a sustainable community based development process. Its success was due to four key policies:

First: Fostering empowerment and accountability in local governance through the nurturing and institutionalization of community based structures, the CDQs.

Second: Responding to the scarcity of public resources by judicious investment and leveraging in order to expand rather than curtail urban services to the poor.

Third: Adopting strategies conducive to long term economic viability and based on sound financial management. Sustainability was ensured by providing the CDQs with seed capital for their initiatives and requiring activities to be operated on a self-supporting basis.

Fourth: Recognizing that the effectiveness of public/private partnership rests on defining a new role for the municipality as catalyst and enabler, and marshaling the higher efficiency of independent micro-entrepreneurs to manage and deliver urban services in the poorer districts through the CDQ structure.

The total seed capital granted to the CDQs by the municipality by 1995 was 16.2 million CFA, about $43,000. In 1994, the municipality allocated 10 million CFA ($20,000) as seed capital for new CDQ activities. The CDQs collected 60 million CFA ($120,000) in fees and mobilized an additional 10 to 15 million CFA ($20,000) for specific projects, including infrastructure. Through the CDQ structure the municipality achieved an impressive leverage ratio of six or higher on the public resources invested. Labor-intensive CDQ activities generated full and part time employment for an estimated 2,000 workers. They provided urgently needed social services and contributed to Adjamé's economic development.

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